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Abstract 
This paper investigates pairwise efficient forward trading followed by spot market 
competition. The model finds that forward trading rules out a “bilateral oligopoly” 
spot market where at least one net seller under-supplies and least one net buyer 
under-procures. If not, both firms, by exercising market power, would hurt each 
other, a negative externality problem which can be mitigated by pairwise forward 
trading. Next, a configuration is analyzed where firms’ marginal costs increase 
linearly with slopes inversely related to their capacities. It is shown that assuming 
market shares equal capacity shares overstates the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, 
a result useful for merger evaluation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, a model of pairwise forward trading is developed that delivers clear 
predictions about the strategic interaction in the spot market. The model does not 
impose restrictions regarding who can sign forward contracts with whom. The 
analysis demonstrates that pairwise forward trading serves the desirable purpose of 
ruling out that the spot market is a bilateral oligopoly market (with both seller and 
buyer power). The analysis of a parametric configuration delineates how the degree 
of market concentration depends on firms’ capacity shares and yields results useful 
for merger investigation. 
Forward contracts are known to decisively affect firms’ incentives to exercise 
market power in commodity spot markets. The theoretical mechanism through 
which this happens is well-understood and has been extensively documented in 
influential empirical work.2 The natural follow-up question—how do firms sign 
forward contracts in equilibrium?—has accordingly received much attention and is 
also the topic of this paper. 
We currently have two main theories to explain forward trade. First, in the field of 
finance, spot market prices are modelled to be volatile. In this type of environment 
forward sales can serve as an instrument to hedge against risk, as laid out in seminal 
work by Holthausen (1979) and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). Second, the 
literature following Allaz and Vila (1993) is based on the idea that forward 
obligations, whenever perfectly observable, can act as a commitment device.3 The 
commitment value, however, is known to break down when firms can also sign 
contracts secretly, for example in an over-the-counter market. Bagwell (1995), for 
 
2
 The theoretical mechanism is presented in the pioneering study by Allaz and Vila (1993). Green 
(1999), Wolak (2000), Bushnell et al. (2008), and Ito and Reguant (2016) are examples of influential 
studies highlighting the importance of contractual arrangements in electricity markets. 
3
 Mahenc and Salanié (2004) show that the competitive effect of strategic commitment crucially 
depends on the presence of strategic substitutes or strategic complements in the spot market. Ferreira 
(2003), Liski and Montero (2006), and Wölfing (2019) are examples of studies investigating the 
relationship between observable forward contracts and collusion. 
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example, shows that small amounts of noise can eliminate a firm’s first-mover 
advantage, and Hughes and Kao (1997) demonstrate that unobservability has 
critical implications in the analysis of forward contracting as commitment device. 
This paper considers a two-period model where a forward trading stage (first stage) 
is followed by a spot market à la Cournot (second stage). The main novelty lies in 
the first stage and is to investigate the solution concept pairwise efficiency, which 
works as follows. Imagine a mesh topology where each strategic firm can trade 
pairwise with all other strategic firms. In this setting, pairwise efficiency requires 
that pairs of strategic firms should not be able to gain from additionally exchanging 
forward obligations bilaterally, considering how doing so would affect their own 
behavior in the spot market and taking as given the other firms’ forward obligations 
and behavior in the spot market.4 The concept does not suppose that all forward 
trade occurs bilaterally—in practice over-the-counter markets and centralized 
auctions oftentimes coexist. Instead, the concept imposes stability conditions with 
respect to the outcome of the forward trading process. These stability conditions 
are relevant whenever there is an over-the-counter market where firms can trade 
secretly, which is the case for many commodity markets in the world. The analysis 
thus has the potential to deliver basic predictions that are robust across markets. 
A key result of the analysis is that strategic firms are either all net sellers or all net 
buyers in the spot market. The intuition is as follows. If the finding would not hold, 
the market would be a bilateral oligopoly, where net sellers exercise seller power 
by under-supplying and net buyers exercise buyer power by under-procuring (see 
Hendricks and McAfee (2010) on a theory of bilateral oligopoly).5 Now consider a 
pairwise forward contract between a prospective net seller and a prospective net 
buyer. The net seller, by selling an additional unit through the forward contract, 
reduces its volume subject to the spot market price. Consequently, it has fewer 
incentives to exercise seller power. Similarly, the net buyer, by purchasing an 
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 In section 3 a formal definition is presented. 
5
 See also e.g. the studies by Wolak (2000), Mansur (2007), Bushnell et al. (2008), Hortacsu and 
Puller (2008), and Hortacsu et al. (2019). 
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additional unit from the net seller through the forward contract, reduces its volume 
procured in the spot market and has fewer incentives to exercise buyer power. 
Such a pairwise contract is always profitable for the following reason. Bilateral 
oligopoly markets have the unique feature that firms, when exercising market 
power, impose negative externalities on the firms that have net positions of the 
opposite sign. A net buyer is hurt by a net seller’s exercise of seller power and a net 
seller is hurt by a net buyer’s exercise of buyer power. By transacting through a 
forward contract rather than in the spot market, firms rule out these negative 
competitive externalities. The analysis thus establishes that a prospective net seller 
and a prospective net buyer have incentives to transact pairwise through a forward 
contract rather than to wait for the spot market to balance their positions. This result 
offers a new explanation why forward contracting is prevalent in markets where 
firms behave strategically. 
Section 4 presents an analysis of a configuration where firms’ marginal costs are 
increasing linearly. The slope of a firm’s marginal cost function is an inverse 
measure of its capacity, such that larger (smaller) firms have a marginal cost 
function characterized by a flatter (steeper) slope.6 The analysis starts by 
considering forward trade between two representative firms with heterogenous 
capacities. It is found that larger firms, as they can modify output more for a given 
change in marginal cost, respond more strongly to a change in forward contract 
position than smaller firms. Consequently, a forward contract between firms with 
asymmetric capacities involves a total output effect. When signing a forward 
contract, asymmetrically sized firms trade off this total output effect against 
production efficiency considerations. 
Next, the analysis is scaled up to cover all pairs in the industry. A key finding in 
this respect is that the property pairwise efficiency is transitive: when two firms 
each trade pairwise-efficiently with a common outsider who has non-zero capacity, 
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 One can analogously think of firms as having marginal valuation functions which are linearly 
decreasing, such that larger (smaller) firms have a marginal valuation function with a flatter (steeper) 
slope. This interpretation is detailed in the Appendix. 
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the pair consisting of those two firms satisfies pairwise efficiency as well. With this 
finding as a stepping stone, section 4 is able to deliver precise predictions regarding 
firms’ market shares. 
What is the relationship between firms’ capacities and their market shares? It is 
found that firms who have more capacity, i.e., whose marginal cost function is 
characterized by a flatter slope, have a larger market share. Since firms with larger 
market shares have more incentives to exercise market power, marginal costs are 
not equalized across firms. The analysis thus establishes that, with pairwise 
efficient forward trade, firms do not fully achieve production efficiency. 
It is also demonstrated that firms’ market shares are invariant with respect to the 
intercepts of their marginal cost functions. This finding can be understood as a 
Coasean result. To gain intuition, one can think of a pairwise forward contract as a 
transfer of output between two firms. Additional output shifts a firm’s marginal 
cost function horizontally to the right, such that a higher amount of output 
corresponds to a lower marginal cost function intercept. In the model, outputs are 
reallocated across firms pairwise-efficiently, and it is found that the outcome of this 
process (i.e., firms’ market shares) is independent of firms’ initial marginal cost 
function intercepts. 
This insight has implications for understanding competition in electricity markets 
with renewables. Production from renewable energy sources could be regarded as 
shifting firms’ marginal cost functions horizontally to the right, thereby affecting 
the marginal cost intercepts but not the slopes. The model thus suggests that, with 
pairwise efficient forward trade, the presence of renewable energy generation 
would not affect firms’ market shares in equilibrium. 
Next, the analysis investigates the relationship between pairwise efficient forward 
trading and market concentration. Does pairwise forward trading exacerbate market 
power, such that dominant firms with large capacity shares have an even larger 
market share? Or does it rather balance firms’ market shares to improve production 
efficiency? To address this question, the predictions about firms’ market shares are 
used to construct the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), defined as the sum of the 
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squared market shares. The HHI is a widely used indicator for market concentration 
and, in Cournot oligopoly, it is intimately related to firms’ markups.7 The analysis 
demonstrates that, with pairwise efficient forward trading, the HHI is smaller than 
the one which would be calculated by naïvely assuming that spot market shares 
equal capacity shares. As such, the analysis has obtained a reassuring result: in the 
parametric configuration with linear marginal costs, pairwise forward trading does 
not lead to the monopolization of the spot market. Put simply, firms’ net sales in 
the spot market are less concentrated than firms’ capacities. 
This finding can be useful in the context of merger evaluation. In the spirit of Perry 
and Porter (1985), mergers can be modelled such that merging partners combine 
their pre-merger capacities without affecting the sum of their capacities.8 The 
analysis of the theoretical model suggests that it would be meaningful to naïvely 
calculate the post-merger HHI by assuming post-merger market shares equal post-
merger capacity shares. Disregarding synergies, that naïve calculation would 
overstate actual concentration post-merger. So, capacity shares can serve to screen 
mergers in industries with forward contracting and where marginal costs are 
reasonably characterized as linear. If the naïve calculation indicates that a merger 
poses a competition concern, a deeper investigation may be warranted. 
This approach has two features which are attractive in the context of merger 
evaluation. First, the approach does not require data regarding firms’ net market 
shares. Such data is in practice not always straightforwardly available, as a full view 
on firms’ contract positions is hard to obtain.9 Instead, firms’ market shares are 
predicted from the model with pairwise efficient forward trade. Second, when 
analyzing a proposed merger, there is a need to account for how firms’ forward 
contracting behavior differs pre-merger versus post-merger. The solution concept 
 
7
 The average Lerner index equals the HHI divided by the price elasticity of demand. 
8
 Stated with the terminology of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), such mergers make it possible to 
reallocate production across facilities but do not generate synergies. 
9
 van Eijkel et al. (2016) study the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas using a dataset that 
consists of “a substantial fraction of all forward and spot contracts”. Hortacsu and Puller (2008) 
infer firms’ forward positions from detailed firm-level bidding data. 
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pairwise efficiency can serve as a theoretical basis for such an analysis and proposes 
an upper bound for the post-merger HHI which can be calculated with information 
about firms’ capacity shares.10 
The framework developed in this paper is distinct from Allaz and Vila (1993) in 
two important respects. First, by studying the solution concept pairwise efficiency, 
the analysis focusses on firms’ incentives to sign secret rather than publicly 
observable contracts. Second, Allaz and Vila (1993) consider forward contracts 
between producers and speculators11, whereas this paper concerns pairwise forward 
trade among strategic firms more generally. To facilitate comparison, the 
framework is set up such that it also incorporates speculators. On this front the 
following result is obtained: a pair consisting of a regular firm (with non-zero 
capacity) and a speculator signs a forward contract that closes the speculator’s 
position. Doing so is optimal as it makes sure that the regular firm is the residual 
claimant on all variable profits in the spot market. With this result, the parametric 
configuration predicts that the HHI is invariant to the presence of speculators. 
The setup is also related in spirit to Anderson and Hu (2008) and Ruddell et al. 
(2018). These papers study forward trade between producers and large retailers who 
are sellers and buyers in the spot market, respectively. In their analyses, however, 
retailers are assumed not to behave strategically in the spot market, an assumption 
which rules out that the spot market is a bilateral oligopoly. In this paper I study 
the effects of forward contracting when both parties engaging in the transaction 
behave strategically. 
The solution concept pairwise efficiency can be relevant not only for modelling 
forward trade in commodity markets but also for modelling forward trade in 
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 Previous work on mergers with endogenous forward contracting by Miller and Podwol (2019) 
relies on the strategic commitment motive for forward contracting with publicly observable 
contracts. Their analysis predicts that mergers reduce the use of forward contracting which can 
amplify the adverse effect on consumers. 
11
 The distinguishing characteristic of a speculator is that it does not have the flexibility to adjust its 
production, rather than that it would not have any production at all. Section 2, which sets up the 
model, therefore categorizes firms using the label flexible or the label inflexible. 
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financial securities markets. In this respect, the study relates to Coutinho (2013) 
who investigates a treasury auction preceded by a when-issued forward market 
which is modelled as a uniform-price auction. In Coutinho (2013), firms’ marginal 
valuation functions have symmetric slopes and asymmetric intercepts. Section 4, 
which develops the parametric configuration, allows for asymmetries on both 
dimensions and shows that their distinction is qualitatively important. For example, 
allowing trading partners to have marginal valuation functions with asymmetric 
slopes is essential to capture the effect of a forward contract on total output. 
The framework also bears similarities with Spiegel (1993) and Van Moer (2019) 
who analyze how two producers optimally sign an ex ante horizontal subcontract 
(upstream) before competing against each other in the product market 
(downstream).12 The condition which characterizes the optimal contract between 
both producers obtained in Spiegel (1993) also appears in section 3 in the analysis 
of a representative pair of firms with non-zero capacities. The contribution 
compared to his paper is to incorporate the possibility of seller and buyer power, 
which is essential for the results in section 3 on the topic of bilateral oligopoly. 
Also, by studying more than two firms, section 4 is able to characterize the extent 
to which the property pairwise efficiency is transitive and is able deliver predictions 
regarding firms’ market shares and the HHI. 
Gans (2007) and Hendricks and McAfee (2010) are two papers which study 
concentration-based indicators of competitiveness in models that account for 
vertical structure. Gans (2007) presents a model of bilateral bargaining which bears 
similarity with the notion pairwise efficiency used in this paper. His model differs, 
however, by having the feature that, when two firms bargain about which quantity 
of inputs to supply each other, they hold fixed their internal supplies. That 
assumption would not be well-suited to investigate forward markets, where it is 
critical to incorporate the effect of a firm’s forward contract position on its optimal 
behavior in the spot market. By incorporating the latter effect, I demonstrate that 
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 Van Moer (2019) shows that two capacity-constrained producers can sign a supply contract to 
escape head-to-head competition in the downstream market. 
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pairwise efficient forward trade rules out bilateral oligopoly. In addition, section 4 
demonstrates that when firms are asymmetrically sized, firms fail to achieve 
production efficiency. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the spot 
market and demonstrates the potential for bilateral oligopoly. Section 3 shows that 
pairwise efficient forward trade rules out that the spot market is a bilateral 
oligopoly. Section 4 analyzes the parametric configuration and presents the 
predictions regarding firms’ market shares and the HHI. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The spot market 
 
There are N  strategic firms, indexed by 1,...,i N= , which interact in a two-stage 
game. The first stage is the forward trading stage and the second stage is the spot 
market which is modelled à la Cournot. This section models the spot market for an 
exogenous outcome of the forward trading stage. 
The volume offered by firm i  in the spot market equals  
 i i iQ x q= + , 
where ix  denotes firm i’s net forward purchases and iq  denotes firm i’s net 
production such that 
 
forward purchases forward sales
production consumption .
i i i
i i i
x
q
= −
= −   
To understand the components of iQ , start with the special case where firm i  is a 
producer and has decided not to engage in forward trade. Firm i ’s volume in the 
spot market then simply equals its production. The above formulation generalizes 
that special case in two respects. First, when firm i  has positive consumption, the 
volume it trades in the spot market is more generally determined by the difference 
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between production and consumption. Second, the formulation accounts for the 
possibility of forward trading: forward purchases act as a substitute for production, 
and firms must cover their forward sales just as they must cover their consumption. 
Firm i  is a net seller in the spot market when 0iQ   and a net buyer in the spot 
market when 0iQ  . Finally, let it  denote firm i ’s net transfer received in the 
forward market such that received transfers paid transfersi i it = − . 
There are two types of strategic firms: flexible firms whose net production is 
adjustable and inflexible firms whose net production is not adjustable. The set of 
flexible firms is denoted by L , the set of inflexible firms is denoted by M  and the 
set of all strategic firms is N  such that L M N+ = . Flexible firms optimize iq  in 
the spot market whereas for inflexible firms iq  is exogenously determined. 
Assumption 1: When firm i  is flexible ( i L ), its cost of attaining net production 
iq  is denoted by ( )i iC q , assumed twice continuously differentiable such that 
( )'' 0i iC q  . 
The Appendix presents the microfoundation for Assumption 1 and details how net 
production follows from adjustable production and adjustable consumption.13 It is 
shown that ( )'' 0i iC q   follows from marginal production costs being strictly 
increasing and marginal valuation functions being strictly decreasing. 
Assumption 2: The inverse demand function equals i
i N
P a b Q

= −   where P  is 
the uniform price and 0b  . 
The demand function can represent non-strategic final consumers or a competitive 
fringe. The demand curve is specified as linear to guarantee a unique equilibrium 
in the spot market.14 
 
13
 Since this study is on the topic of bilateral oligopoly, it is valuable to highlight both interpretations. 
14
 Assuming that the second derivative satisfies '' 0P   is insufficient in this regard because firms’ 
volumes in the spot market can be positive or negative. 
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We are now ready to analyze the equilibrium in the spot market. We can write a 
flexible firm’s profits as 
 ( )  for i i i i it P Q C q i L = +  −  , 
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that the first-order conditions for maximization with 
respect to iq  are necessary and sufficient. They equal 
 ( ) ( )* ' *  for i i i iP b x q C q i L−  + =  . (1) 
This shows that flexible firms who are net sellers ( 0iQ  ) have a marginal net 
production cost below the market-clearing price. In contrast, flexible firms who are 
net buyers ( 0iQ  ) have a marginal net production cost above the market-clearing 
price. 
The spot market is said to be a bilateral oligopoly when at least one flexible firm is 
a net buyer and at least one flexible firm is a net seller. We are now ready to state 
Result 1. 
Result 1: For exogenous forward contract positions, the spot market can be a 
bilateral oligopoly. 
The proof of this possibility result is by example. Since the example is instructive, 
it is presented here. The example considers an industry consisting of two flexible 
firms, 1 and 2  with 1, 2 L . The inflexible firms, for simplicity, sell a zero volume 
in the spot market ( 0iQ =  for all i M ). Firms 1  and 2  differ regarding their 
marginal cost to attain a net production equal to i iq x= −  such that 
( ) ( )' '1 1 2 2C x a C x−   − . In words, attaining a volume of zero in the spot market, 
i.e., balancing internally, requires little effort for firm 1 but great effort for firm 2. 
Such a situation might arise, for example, when firm 1  can produce cheaply or has 
purchased many units through forward contracts, and the situation for firm 2 is less 
favorable. 
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The proof, which is presented formally in the Appendix, shows that in this example 
firm 1 acts as net seller in the spot market and firm 2 acts as net buyer in the spot 
market. Intuitively, for the market to clear, the price can neither be too low (
( )'1 1P C x − ) nor too high ( ( )'2 2P C x − ). Indeed, in the former case, no market 
participant would be selling in the spot market, a situation which would be in 
violation with the market-clearing condition. In the latter case, no market 
participant would be buying, thereby also violating the market-clearing condition. 
The proof shows that in the example firm 1 acts as net seller and firm 2 acts as net 
buyer. 
Importantly, from a welfare point of view, the combined presence of seller power 
and buyer power does not cancel each other out. In the example, firm 1  is a net 
seller in the spot market and accordingly under-supplies the market ( ( )' *1 1C q P ). 
Firm 2  is a net buyer in the spot market and so under-procures ( ( )' *2 2C q P ). The 
wedge between firms’ marginal costs indicates an inefficiency: there is potential to 
improve welfare if firm 1 increases its net production and firm 2  decreases its net 
production. 
Remark also that there are negative competitive externalities in the following sense. 
Firm 1, being net seller, would benefit if firm 2  under-procures to a lesser extent. 
Firm 2, being net buyer, would benefit if firm 1 under-supplies to a lesser extent. 
This idea will be formalized in the next section, which endogenizes firms’ forward 
trading behavior. 
In summary, when forward contract positions are exogenous, the spot market can 
be composed of flexible firms who are net sellers and other flexible firms who are 
net buyers. Such a market structure is a bilateral oligopoly which involves 
inefficiencies. 
 
3. Pairwise efficient forward trade 
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This section investigates pairwise efficient forward trade among strategic firms, 
which is modelled according to the following definition. 
Definition 1 (Pairwise efficiency). A vector of net forward purchases ( )1,..., Nx x  is 
pairwise efficient if, for any  , 1, 2,...,i j N  such that i j , firms i  and j  cannot 
increase their joint profit by bilaterally exchanging additional units through a 
forward contract, holding fixed the net forward purchases of the other firms in the 
industry ( kx  is fixed for all ,k i j ) and the beliefs of all firms about the forward 
contracts they are not involved in, so that net production kq  for all ,k i j  is 
unaffected by the contract. 
The first part of definition 1 captures the idea that the network of bilateral links has 
a mesh topology: all firms can trade pairwise with all other firms. Pairwise 
efficiency then requires firms’ forward contract positions to be such that each pair 
of strategic firms that can be formed in a mesh topology cannot gain by engaging 
in additional bilateral trade. In the parametric configuration presented in section 4, 
it is demonstrated that the analysis is equivalent for a star topology with one central 
flexible firm. 
Pairwise efficiency relates closely to Jeon and Lefouili (2018)’s concept bilateral 
efficiency in their analysis of cross-licensing agreements between horizontal 
competitors. Similar concepts have also been used to study vertical relations.15 One 
difference in comparison with the vertical relations literature is that in this 
framework one cannot satisfactorily classify firms as either upstream or 
downstream.16 Therefore, it seems most natural that the solution concept in the 
 
15
 The concept pairwise efficiency bears similarities with e.g. Crémer and Riordan (1987) on 
contract equilibrium, Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) on passive beliefs and 
pairwise-proof equilibrium, and Collard-Wexler et al. (2019) on Nash-in-Nash bilateral bargaining. 
16
 One approach would be to classify firms based on whether they are active in the forward market 
or in the spot market. Firms, however, are typically active in both markets, and so could not be 
classified as upstream or downstream with this approach. Another approach could be to classify 
firms according to whether they are net sellers or net buyers. Such an approach, however, also does 
not seem very appealing in this context, as a firm’s role as net seller or net buyer is the result of 
optimality conditions rather than that it is imposed by the model. 
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forward market places no restrictions regarding who can trade with whom, which 
is the approach taken here.  
There exist three types of pairs: pairs consisting of two flexible firms, pairs 
consisting of a flexible and an inflexible firm, and pairs consisting of two inflexible 
firms. 
The following notation is used to distinguish the different types of pairs. The 
indices e  and f  are used to indicate flexible firms, such that e L  and f L  with 
e f . Next, the indices g  and h  indicate inflexible firms such that g M  and 
h M  with g h . Firm e  and firm f  then form a representative pair of flexible 
firms, the type of pairs analyzed in subsection 3.1. Firm e  and firm g  form a 
representative pair consisting of a flexible and an inflexible firm, the pairs which 
are the topic of subsection 3.2. Finally, firm g  and firm h  form a representative 
pair of inflexible firms and are analyzed in subsection 3.3. 
3.1. Pairs consisting of two flexible firms 
This subsection investigates the representative pair of flexible firms ( ),e f . The 
goal is to obtain a necessary condition for pairwise efficiency and to show that it 
rules out that the spot market is a bilateral oligopoly. The result is shown by 
contradiction. Suppose the spot market would be a bilateral oligopoly. Then, there 
must exist a pair of flexible firms that consists of a net seller in the spot market and 
a net buyer in the spot market. Without loss of generality, denote the net seller in 
the spot market by firm e  and denote the net buyer in the spot market by firm f . 
The remainder of this subsection is devoted to showing that firms e  and f  could 
have gained from transacting pairwise through a forward contract, a finding which 
demonstrates the contradiction. We denote firms’ candidate net forward purchases 
by superscript c : c
e
x  for firm e  and cfx  for firm f . Next, we investigate whether 
firms have incentives to sign an additional forward contract where firm e  sells   
15 
 
units to firm f .17 Consequently, c
e e
x x = −  and cf fx x = + . Similarly, firms’ 
candidate net transfers are denoted by c
e
t  and cft , and with the forward contract 
firms can exchange   monetary units such that c
e e
t t = +  and cf ft t = − . Since 
the transfer paid by one firm is received by the other firm, the sum 
e ft t+  is 
unaffected. 
Two remarks are useful. First, as can be seen from the first-order conditions (1), 
neither et  nor ft  affects 
*
e
q  or *fq . Financial transfers occur in the forward trading 
stage and are therefore regarded as sunk when firms compete in the spot market. 
Second, according to Definition 1, the pairwise contract does not affect the behavior 
of outsiders to the contract. Consequently, we have that ( )* *,i iq q  =  for 
, ,i L i e f  . 
The pair of firms solves the following problem: 
 
,
max
e f   + , 
where firms’ variable profits are 
 ( )( )*ce e e e et PQ C q  = + + −  (2) 
 ( )( )*cf f f f ft PQ C q  = − + − , (3) 
and 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
*
,
*
*
.
e f i i i i
i L i M
i e f
c
e e e
c
f f f
P a b Q Q x q x q
Q x q
Q x q
 
 
 

  = − + + + + +   
= − +
= + +
 
  (4) 
 
17
 Denoting firm e  as the seller and firm f  as the buyer of the forward contract is without loss of 
generality because   can be positive or negative. 
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Bilateral profits (2) + (3) can be seen to be independent of  . Consequently, the 
pair of firms maximizes bilateral profits with respect to  . When the gains from 
bilateral trade are positive, there exists a transfer   that shares these gains from 
trade such that both firms are willing to engage in the forward contract. Maximizing 
with respect to  , we obtain the necessary first-order condition 
 
( ) ( )( )
0e f
d
d
   

+ = , 
which can be written as  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* ** *
* * * *
00 0
0f f f f fe ee e e
e f e f
dq dqdq dq
q d q d q d q d
       
     
== =
    + + + + + =      , 
where the notation 
*
i
jq

  is used as a shorthand notation for 
*
j j
i
j q q
q

=

 . The first two 
terms represent the direct effects, which equal 0fe P P

 
 + = − + =  . Moreover, 
we know that firm e  and firm f ’s quantity choices in the spot market satisfy their 
first-order conditions, so that 
* *
0fe
e fq q
  = =   (the envelope theorem). Therefore, 
we obtain that pairwise efficiency requires 
 
( ) ( )* *
* *
0f f ee
f e
dq dq
q d q d
  
 
 + =  . (5) 
We next explore each of the four terms in (5). Firms’ first-order conditions in the 
spot market equal 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
* ' *
* ' *
0
0,
c
e e e e
c
f f f f
P b x q C q
P b x q C q
  
  
− − + − =
− + + − =
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where P  is characterized by equation (4). Totally differentiating with respect to   
gives 
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
**
'' *
**
'' *
2 0
2 0.
fe
e e
fe
f f
dqdq
b b C q b
d d
dqdq
b b b C q
d d
  
  
+ − − + − =
− + − + − − =
  
This is a system of equations which can be solved to obtain 
 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
*
'' *
*
'' *
'' * '' * '' * '' *
3   0
3   0
where 3 2 .
e
f f
f
e e
e e f f e e f f
dq
b C q C
d
dq
b C q C
d
C b C q C q C q C q b
 
 
   
 = +  = − + 
 + + +
(6) 
Relation (6) characterizes how firms alter their net production in response to the 
forward contract. First consider firm e , who sells the forward contract. To gain 
intuition, imagine what would happen when firms’ levels of net production would 
be unchanged. Any forward sales by firm e  to firm f  would then cause a one-to-
one reduction in firm e ’s spot market volume (
e
Q ). The forward contract would 
thus make firm e  a smaller seller. Holding smaller stakes in the spot market, firm 
e
 has less incentives to exercise seller power. Therefore, firm e  raises net 
production. According to (6), we have that ( )*0 1edq d   , meaning that the 
increase in net production mitigates - but does not fully offset - the decrease in spot 
market volume. Second, in an analogous way, relation (6) finds that firm f  who 
buys the forward contract reduces its net production according to 
( )*1 0fdq d −   . 
Next, we can use (2), (3) and (4) to write 
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( )( )
( )( )
*
*
*
*
,
ce
e e
f
f c
f f
e
b x q
q
b x q
q
  
  
 = − − +
 = − + +
 (7) 
so that 
 
( )
( )
*
*
*
*
0 when  0
0 when 0.
ce
e e
f
f c
f f
e
x q
q
x q
q
  
  
  − + 
  + + 
  (8) 
Relation (7) characterizes how a firm’s profits depend on the quantity choice of the 
trading partner. It states that a net seller (buyer) in the spot market suffers (benefits) 
when the trading partner increases its level of net production. 
The combination of (6) and (8) demonstrates that, whenever firm e  is net seller and 
firm f  is net buyer in the spot market, the necessary condition for pairwise 
efficiency (5) fails to hold. Consequently, we have arrived the following result. 
Result 2: With pairwise efficient forward trade, the spot market is never a bilateral 
oligopoly. Formally, 0iQ   for all i L  or 0iQ   for all i L . 
When firm e  is a prospective net seller in the spot market and firm f  is a 
prospective net buyer in the spot market, firms e  and f  can always gain from 
letting firm e  sell to firm f  in the forward market, which establishes the 
contradiction. Such a forward contract reduces firm f ’s volume procured in the 
spot market, which reduces its incentives to exercise buyer power (firm f ’s net 
production decreases according to (6)). This effect benefits firm e , who is a net 
seller in the spot market, and is formally represented by the first term of equation 
(5). Also, with the forward contract, firm e ’s volume in the spot market shrinks, so 
that it has fewer incentives to exercise seller power in the spot market (firm e ’s net 
production increases according to (6)). This effect benefits firm f , who is a net 
buyer in the spot market, and is formally represented by the second term of equation 
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(5). So, the forward contract reduces the competitive externalities that firms inflict 
upon each other, which is mutually beneficial. For this reason, firms always have 
incentives to sign forward contracts to rule out a bilateral oligopoly spot market. 
The model setup in this subsection compares closely to Spiegel (1993) who 
investigates how two duopoly producers optimally sign an ex ante horizontal 
subcontract before competing against each other in the product market.18 In his 
paper both firms are sellers in the product market. An ex ante subcontract between 
two producers is then not always profitable as the seller of the ex ante subcontract 
responds to the contract by raising production, which hurts the other producer. The 
analysis here differs by studying commodity markets where trade occurs between 
a prospective net seller and a prospective net buyer in the spot market. Both firms 
then respond to the contract in a way that benefits the counterparty. With this 
finding it is demonstrated that pairwise efficient forward contracting rules out 
bilateral oligopoly. 
In summary, a prospective net seller and a prospective net buyer have incentives to 
sign a forward contract rather than to wait to balance their positions in the spot 
market. This result offers a new explanation why forward contracting is prevalent 
in commodity markets with strategic firms. 
3.2. Pairs consisting of a flexible and an inflexible firm 
This subsection considers the representative pair of a flexible and an inflexible firm 
( ),e g . It is shown that a necessary condition for pairwise efficiency is that the 
inflexible firm sells a volume equal to zero in the spot market ( 0gQ = ). 
We apply the same techniques: we denote firms’ candidate net forward purchases 
by superscript c , and we suppose that firm e  sells   units to firm g , so that 
 
18
 The condition for a pair of flexible firms to satisfy pairwise efficiency (5) is similar to the 
condition characterizing the optimal ex ante subcontract in Spiegel (1993, p. 581). To see the 
comparison, use that *1
e e
dQ d dq d = − + , *1f fdQ d dq d = + , 'P b= − , and 
( ) ( ) ( )' * ' *e e f f e fC q C q b Q Q− = − −  which follows from (1). 
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c
e e
x x = −  and cg gx x = + . Firms’ net financial transfers equal ce et t = +  and 
c
g gt t = − . As before, according to Definition 1, the spot market behavior of 
outsiders to the contract is independent of  . We can thus write that 
( )* *,  for ,i iq q i L i e  =   . 
The pair of firms solves the following problem: 
,
max
e g   + , where firms’ 
variable profits equal 
 ( )( )*ce e e e et PQ C q  = + + −   (9) 
 
c
g g gt PQ = − + , (10) 
where 
 
( ) ( )
( )
*
*
.
e g i i i i
i L i M
i e i g
c
e e e
c
g g g
P a b Q Q x q x q
Q x q
Q x q
 

 
 
  = − + + + + +   
= − +
= + +
 
 (11) 
As in subsection 3.1., the pair of firms maximizes the gains from bilateral trade 
with respect to   and the transfer   shares the gains from trade but leaves bilateral 
profits unaffected. We obtain the necessary first-order condition 
( ) ( )* *
* *
00
0g ge ee e
e e
dq dq
q d q d
   
   
==
  + + + =    . 
The first two terms represent the direct effects, which sum up to zero. The third 
term is zero because of the envelope theorem. Consequently, additional forward 
trade affects bilateral profits only through firm e ’s quantity choice (the fourth 
term). We work out and obtain 
 ( ) ( )* 0
g
ec
g g
Q
dq
b x q
d
 − + + = . (12) 
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We are now ready to state Result 3. 
Result 3: Pairwise efficient forward trade requires that the inflexible firms sell a 
volume equal to zero in the spot market: 
 0 for all iQ i M=  . (13) 
The proof is in the Appendix. If Result 3 would not hold, there would exist an 
inflexible firm with a non-zero volume in the spot market. Without loss of 
generality, denote that firm by g  and consider the pair of firms e  and g . Firm e  
would pose an externality on firm g  because its quantity decision affects the price 
that firm g  receives or pays in the spot market. Under pairwise efficiency, firms 
sign the forward contract that eliminates this externality by closing firm g ’s 
position. 
Comparing with Allaz and Vila (1993), the analysis here differs by studying the 
possibility for firms to sign secret contracts, which do not affect the behavior of 
outsiders (according to Definition 1). Result 3 finds that inflexible firms do not 
serve as a vehicle for strategic commitment: they sign forward contracts to close 
any open position they might otherwise have. With pairwise efficient forward trade 
they hold no stakes in the spot market. 
3.3. Pairs consisting of two inflexible firms 
Finally, consider pairwise trade between two inflexible firms g  and h . As in the 
previous subsections, we investigate firms’ incentives to trade   additional units 
in the forward market in exchange for transfer  , such that cg gx x = − , ch hx x = +
, 
c
g gt t = + , and ch ht t = − . 
Firms’ bilateral profits equal c cg h g g h ht PQ t PQ   + = + + + − + , where 
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( ) ( )*
,
,
g h i i i i
i L i M
i g h
c
g g g
c
h h h
P a b Q Q x q x q
Q x q
Q x q


 

 
 = − + + + + +   
= − +
= + +
 
  (14) 
and are unaffected by   or  . Consequently, pairs consisting of two inflexible 
firms always satisfy pairwise efficiency. 
In summary, from Result 2, we know that flexible firms have incentives to transact 
with each in the forward market rather than in the spot market, in order to avoid 
inefficiencies from bilateral oligopoly. Result 3 states that, with pairwise 
efficiency, inflexible firms close their position entirely in the forward market. 
Consequently, the counterparties of strategic firms in the spot market cannot be 
strategic firms themselves. At least one “side” of the spot market—all net sellers or 
all net buyers—must belong to the non-strategic fringe. 
 
4. A parametric configuration 
 
This section analyzes a parametric configuration and obtains predictions regarding 
firms’ market shares in the spot market. Suppose that flexible firms are 
characterized by quadratic net production cost functions 
 ( ) 20.5  for i i i i i
i
C q c q q i L
k
= +  , (15) 
where ic  is firm i ’s marginal cost intercept and 0ik   represents a measure of firm 
i ’s flexible capacity. The marginal net production cost can be written as 
( )'i i i i iC q c q k= + . Consequently, with a doubling of flexible capacity ik , firm i ’s 
marginal cost function increases at half the rate, or 
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 ( )"
1
i
i i
k
C q
=   (16) 
The Appendix presents the microfoundation showing that the amount of flexible 
capacity can be interpreted as the sum of adjustable production capacity and 
adjustable consumption capacity. The sum of all flexible firms’ capacities is 
denoted by 
 i
i L
K k

 . (17) 
The setup allows firms to be heterogenous in two respects. First, firms can be 
subject to firm-specific output shifters, as captured by ic  which measures parallel 
shifts of firm i ’s marginal cost function. Second, firms can be asymmetrically sized 
in terms of flexible capacity as captured by ik . 
The analysis of the parametric configuration starts by investigating the relationship 
between a flexible firm’s size ( ik ) and the extent to which it alters net production 
in response to a change in forward contract position. In this respect, consider the 
representative pair of flexible firms ( ),e f  as analyzed in subsection 3.1, which 
engages in a forward contract where firm e  sells   units to firm f . Using (6), both 
firms adjust net production according to the following relation 
 
( )
( )
*
*
13
13
1 1 1
where 3 2 .
e
f
f
e
e f e f
dq
b C
kd
dq
b C
kd
C b
k k bk k




  = +        = − +   
 = + + +   
  (18) 
When 
e fk k= , joint net production is invariant to the forward contract (
( ) ( )* * 0e fdq d dq d   + = ). When e fk k , firm e  who is larger adjusts net 
production more strongly than firm f  who is smaller, so that 
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( ) ( )* *e fdq d dq d    − . Intuitively, when ek  is large, firm e  can increase 
(decrease) its net production more strongly for a given increase (decrease) in 
marginal cost. When 
e fk k , the opposite relation holds true (
( ) ( )* *e fdq d dq d    − ). 
We are now ready to state Result 4, proven in the Appendix, which presents 
necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise efficiency. 
Result 4: In the parametric configuration, the following conditions are necessary 
and sufficient for the representative pairs ( ),e f  and ( ),e g  to satisfy pairwise 
efficiency: 
 
1 13 3
e f
e f
Q b Q b
k k
  + = +       
 (19) 
 0gQ = . (20) 
According to relation (19), each flexible firm’s volume in the spot market is of the 
same sign, which is consistent with the prediction of the more general model 
(Result 2). Also, firms who have less flexible capacity have a smaller market share, 
and in the limit a firm with an infinitesimally small capacity has an almost zero 
market share in the spot market. This insight is qualitatively in line with Result 3, 
which has shown that with pairwise efficiency inflexible firms – who can be 
thought of as having zero capacity - must sell a zero volume in the spot market. 
Why do larger firms have a larger market share? In other words, why don’t forward 
contracts equalize firms’ market shares and thereby equalize firms’ marginal net 
production costs? The reason is that, when firms are asymmetrically sized, industry 
output is not invariant to how forward obligations are allocated. More specifically, 
firms who have more capacity increase (decrease) their net production more 
strongly in response to an increase (decrease) in their forward obligations, as was 
demonstrated in (18). For asymmetrically sized firms this generates a tradeoff 
between production efficiency and reducing competition. 
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For example, if firms are net sellers, the model predicts that larger firms have larger 
net sales. Consequently, due to seller power, larger firms “under-supply” to a higher 
extent. A large firm could have considered selling additional units to a smaller firm 
using a pairwise forward contract. As a result, both firms’ marginal net production 
costs would have converged, thereby improving production efficiency. However, 
according to (18), the larger firm would have increased its supply by more than the 
amount by which the smaller firm would have decreased its supply. Consequently, 
the market-clearing price would have decreased, hurting both firms. The relative 
market volumes according to (19) are the result of asymmetrically sized firms 
balancing both considerations. 
Result 4 also reports on the conditions for pairwise efficient trade between a flexible 
and an inflexible firm. From Result 3, we already know that (20) is necessary for 
pairwise efficiency. Result 4 shows in the parametric configuration that (20) is also 
sufficient for pairwise efficiency. 
We are now ready to report Result 5 which is an essential ingredient of the analysis. 
The solution concept as defined in Definition 1 requires all possible pairs in a mesh 
topology to satisfy pairwise efficiency. The next result, proven in the Appendix, 
states that for such pairwise efficiency to obtain, it is not necessary that all pairs of 
firms actively engage in bilateral trade. When two firms each trade pairwise-
efficiently with a flexible firm as common counterparty, the bilateral link composed 
of those two firms satisfies pairwise efficiency by transitivity. 
Result 5: (transitivity). In the parametric configuration, consider any flexible firm 
j L . When firms i  and j  trade pairwise-efficiently and when firms j  and k  
trade pairwise-efficiently, it follows that the bilateral link between i  and k  is also 
pairwise efficient. 
The transitivity result implies that the predictions of pairwise efficiency are not 
sensitive to the assumption that each firm should actively trade bilaterally with each 
other firm. For example, the predictions of pairwise efficiency are unaltered when 
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forward trading occurs through a star topology where any flexible firm is the central 
firm. 
Result 5 is also useful from a technical perspective. It states that, to analyze the 
implications of pairwise efficiency, one can restrict attention to requiring that firms 
trade pairwise-efficiently with a central flexible firm. This insight drastically 
reduces the number of bilateral links that need to be considered in the analysis.  
Denote firms’ market shares in the spot market by 
1
.
N
i i j
j
s Q Q
=
=   The following 
result, proven in the Appendix, characterizes firms’ market shares with pairwise 
efficiency. 
Result 6: In the parametric configuration, pairwise efficient forward trade holds if 
and only if firms’ market shares in the spot market equal 
 
1
1
, where 3 , for 
          
0                                                     for .
i j i
i j L i
b i L
s k
i M
  
−

    +  =    

 (21) 
Result 6 presents the predictions from pairwise efficiency regarding firms’ market 
shares in the spot market. Those market shares are found to be invariant to firms’ 
marginal cost function intercepts ( ic ). To interpret this finding, imagine that firm 
i , next to having access to adjustable net production, is also endowed with an 
amount of non-adjustable net production. The endowment would shift firm i ’s 
marginal cost function horizontally to the right, such that a higher endowment 
corresponds to a lower ic . Next, think of a pairwise forward contract as an exchange 
of endowments between two firms. In the model, endowments are reallocated 
across firms pairwise-efficiently. The invariance finding can now be understood as 
a Coasean result: with pairwise efficient forward trading, firms’ market shares are 
independent of their initial endowments of non-adjustable net production. 
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Remark that the framework has thus far not introduced an assumption regarding the 
sum of all strategic firms’ net forward purchases ( i
i N
x

 ). Since any forward 
purchase held by one firm must imply a forward liability by another firm, it must 
be true that the competitive fringe holds net forward purchases equal to i
i N
x

− . 
The results derived in this section are thus robust with respect to the contract 
position held by the competitive fringe.19 
The market shares according to (21) allow to construct the traditional indicators of 
competitiveness such as the C4 ratio or the HHI. The following result concerns the 
HHI and can be useful in the context of merger analysis. The Appendix presents 
the proof. 
Result 7. Denote the number of flexible firms by n  and consider the parametric 
configuration. Assuming that each flexible firm has a market share equal to 1 n  
understates the HHI and assuming that market shares equal capacity shares 
overstates the HHI. Formally,  
 ( ) ( )2 221 i i
i L i N i L
n s k K
  
    . (22) 
The first inequality in (22) follows from Result 4 which has demonstrated that, with 
pairwise efficiency, inflexible firms sell a zero volume in the spot market. 
Consequently, the HHI is independent of inflexible firms. Assuming that all 
flexible firms have a symmetric market share equal to 1 n  thus understates the HHI. 
The second inequality in (22) relates to the conditions for pairwise efficient forward 
trading between flexible firms. Such forward trading involves a tradeoff between 
production efficiency and reducing competition. On the one hand, firms benefit 
 
19
 According to Result 5, pairwise efficiency holds if a central flexible firm trades pairwise-
efficiently with each of the 1N −  other firms. So, a consequence of not making an assumption about 
the level of i
i N
x

−  is that the vector of net forward purchases ( )1 , ..., Nx x  is underdetermined with 
degree of freedom one. 
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from symmetric market shares, as more symmetric market shares imply that firms 
have similar marginal net production costs, which is cost-efficient. On the other 
hand, it also implies a higher intensity of competition, and therefore means that 
fewer rents are extracted from the fringe. In the parametric configuration, the 
former effect is sufficiently strong so that the spot market volumes are more 
symmetric than capacity shares. Calculating the HHI based on the naïve assumption 
that market shares equal capacity shares overstates the actual HHI. 
Relationship (22) has implications for the evaluation of mergers in industries where 
marginal costs are reasonably characterized as linear. It demonstrates that, 
disregarding synergies, calculating a post-merger HHI with the assumption that 
market shares equal capacity shares is conservative by overstating post-merger 
concentration. Capacity shares, whenever such data are available, may thus be 
suitable to screen which mergers require more careful investigation. 
In summary, the parametric configuration has obtained predictions regarding firms’ 
market shares under pairwise efficient forward trade. With these predictions a lower 
and upper bound for the HHI were constructed, bounds which can be calculated 
with information regarding the number of strategic flexible firms and their capacity 
shares. 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
Many commodity products are traded through forward contracts. This paper has 
studied the implications of pairwise efficient forward trading, a solution concept 
which requires each strategic firm to trade pairwise-efficiently with all other 
strategic firms, on the strategic interaction in the spot market. The model has 
demonstrated that, with pairwise efficient forward trading, the spot market is never 
a bilateral oligopoly. If the finding would not hold, there would exist a pair of 
strategic firms consisting of a prospective net seller and a prospective net buyer. 
The net seller, by exercising seller power, would hurt the net buyer, and the net 
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buyer, by exercising buyer power, would hurt the net seller. Pairwise forward 
trading mitigates this negative externality problem and is always in both firms’ joint 
interest. It also involves an efficiency gain as it reduces incentives for the net seller 
to withhold supply and reduces incentives for the net buyer to withhold demand. 
This theory offers a new explanation why forward contracting is prevalent in 
markets with strategic firms and, in contrast with the strategic commitment 
mechanism proposed by Allaz and Vila (1993), it does not require contracts to be 
publicly observable. 
The parametric configuration has considered marginal cost functions which are 
increasing linearly with slopes inversely related to firms’ capacities. It is shown 
that the property pairwise efficiency is transitive: when two firms each trade 
pairwise-efficiently with a common counterparty who has non-zero capacity, their 
direct bilateral link also satisfies pairwise efficiency. With this result the analysis 
has yielded clear predictions regarding firms’ market shares in the spot market. 
These predictions can be used to investigate concentration-based indicators of 
competitiveness. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is shown to be smaller 
than the HHI following from a naïve calculation which would assume that market 
shares equal capacity shares. This result can be useful for merger evaluation in 
commodity markets where marginal costs can reasonably be characterized as linear. 
It proposes that whenever capacity shares data are available, they can serve to 
screen which mergers require closer attention. Another insight from the analysis is 
that the HHI is invariant to firms’ levels of non-adjustable production and non-
adjustable consumption. In the electricity industry, generation sourcing from e.g. 
nuclear, wind, or solar is oftentimes characterized as must-run (i.e., non-
adjustable). Accordingly, the model suggests that the HHI is invariant to the amount 
of generation from these sources. 
Whereas this paper has investigated the implications of pairwise efficient forward 
trading, it has not addressed the question which market microstructures lead to 
pairwise efficient forward trading. Insights on this front, though being beyond the 
scope of this paper, seem worthwhile pursuing. Also, it would be useful to have a 
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more comprehensive model of forward trade that includes not only strategic aspects 
but also the risk-hedging motive for forward trading. Perhaps such a model could 
explore the interactions between both trading motives and generate empirical 
predictions that allow to measure the relative importance of the different theories. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Microfoundation for Assumption 1  
Consider a flexible firm i L . Decompose firm i ’s net production as i i iq r s= −  
where ir  equals firm i ’s production and is  equals firm i ’s consumption. It is shown 
that ( )'' 0i iC q   follows from marginal production costs being strictly increasing 
and marginal valuation functions being strictly decreasing. 
Two special cases are straightforward to analyze. First, when firm i  only has 
adjustable production, its consumption is  is fixed. Denote production costs by 
( )i ir  and marginal production costs by ( )'i ir , where i i ir q s= + . Since 
consumption is fixed, raising net production occurs exclusively by raising 
production. We then have that ( ) ( )'' '' 0i i i i iC q q s= +   because of strictly 
increasing marginal production costs. Second, when firm i  only has adjustable 
consumption, production ir  is fixed. Denote the valuation function by ( )i is  and 
the marginal valuation function by ( )'i is , where i i is r q= − . Since production is 
fixed, raising net production occurs exclusively by reducing consumption. We then 
have that ( ) ( )'' '' 0i i i i iC q r q= − −   because the marginal valuation function is 
strictly decreasing. 
Next consider the case where both production and consumption are adjustable. To 
obtain a net production equal to iq , firm i  solves the following cost minimization 
problem: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
,
min
i ir s i i i i i i
C q r s = − , (A1) 
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subject to i i is r q= − . Plugging in, we get ( ) ( )min ir i i i i ir r q − −   , which yields 
the first-order condition 
 ( ) ( )' * ' * 0i i i i ir r q − − = . (A2) 
Firm i  thus optimally chooses a production and a consumption level such that its 
marginal production cost equals its marginal consumption value (see also 
Hendricks and McAfee (2010)). Differentiating (A2) with respect to iq  gives 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )'' * * '' * *' ' 1 0i i i i i i i i i i ir q r q r q q r q   − − − =  . (A3) 
We can rewrite (A3) as 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
'' * *
*'' *
' 1
'
i i i i
i ii i i
r r q
r qr q


−=− . (A4) 
Since ( )'' * 0i ir   and ( )'' * 0i i ir q −   the left-hand side of (A4) is negative. 
Consequently, it must be true that the right-hand side is also negative, or 
( )*0 ' 1i ir q  . This means that attaining a higher net production occurs partly by 
increasing production (at rate ( )* 'i ir q ) and partly by reducing consumption (at rate 
( )*1 'i ir q− ). 
Finally, we look for the sign of ( )''i iC q . Differentiating (A1), we can write 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' ' * * ' * *' ' 1i i i i i i i i i i iC q r r q r q r q = − − − , which by using (A2) simplifies to 
( ) ( )' ' *i i i iC q r= . Differentiating again yields 
 ( ) ( ) ( )'' '' * * 'i i i i i iC q r r q= . (A5) 
The feature that ( )'' 0i iC q   now follows from using that ( )'' 0i ir   and that 
( )*0 ' 1i ir q  . 
Proof of Result 1. 
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The proof considers the example laid out in the main text, which has the feature 
that 
 ( ) ( )' '1 1 2 2C x a C x−   − . (A6) 
Step 1 establishes four ingredients which are needed. Step 2 demonstrates that the 
spot market is a bilateral oligopoly. 
Step 1. 
1a. We first show that, whenever ( )'i iC x P−  , we must have that 0iQ  . Indeed, 
suppose not, then 0iQ  . Consequently, ( ) ( )' * 'i i i iC q C x − , and by plugging in this 
inequality into the first-order condition (1) we get ( ) ( )* 'i i i iP b x q C x−  +  − . Since 
( )'i iC x P−  , we must thus have that ( )*i iP b x q P−  +  , equivalently written as 
( )* 0i ib x q−  +  , which violates that 0iQ   and hence proves the contradiction. 
1b. Second, in an analogous way, we show that whenever ( )'i iP C x − , we must 
have that 0iQ  . Indeed, suppose not, then 0iQ  . Consequently, 
( ) ( )' * 'i i i iC q C x − , and by the first-order condition (1) we get 
( ) ( )* 'i i i iP b x q C x−  +  − . Since ( )'i iP C x − , we must have that 
( )*i iP b x q P−  +  , equivalently written as ( )* 0i ib x q−  +  , which violates that 
0iQ   and hence proves the contradiction. 
1c. Third, we establish that whenever ( )'i iP C x= −  we must have 0iQ = . Indeed, 
when 0iQ = , we have ( ) ( )' * 'i i i iC q C x= −  and the first-order condition (1) which is 
necessary and sufficient holds. 
1d. Fourth, from Assumption 2, P a  implies that 
1,2
0i
i
Q
=
  and P a  implies 
that 
1,2
0i
i
Q
=
 . 
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Step 2. 
We now establish that the equilibrium price must lie within the following interval 
( ) ( )' '1 1 2 2C x P C x−   −  by showing that either of the extremes violates that the 
market clears. With this insight, it follows from 1a and 1b that firm 1 must be a net 
seller and firm 2 must be a net buyer. 
First, consider the possibility that ( )'1 1P C x − . By (A6), 1a, 1b and 1c, we must 
have 1 0Q   and 2 0Q  , so that 
1,2
0i
i
Q
=
 . However, from (A6), ( )'1 1P C x −  also 
implies that P a , so that from 1d we would have that 
1,2
0i
i
Q
=
 . This 
demonstrates a contraction. Therefore, ( )'1 1P C x −  and, by 1a, firm 1  must be a 
net seller. 
Second, consider the possibility that ( )'2 2P C x − . By (A6), 1a, 1b and 1c, we must 
have 1 0Q   and 2 0Q  , so that 
1,2
0i
i
Q
=
 . However, using (A6), ( )'2 2P C x −  
must also imply that P a . From 1d, therefore, 
1,2
0i
i
Q
=
 , a contradiction. 
Consequently, ( )'2 2P C x −  and, by 1b, firm 2  must be a net buyer. This 
establishes that the market is a bilateral oligopoly. 
Proof of Result 3. 
Step one establishes that ( )* 0edq
d

  . Step two establishes that 
0cg g gQ x q= + + = . 
Step 1. 
We start from firm e ’s first-order condition in the spot market, which equals 
 ( )( ) ( )( )* ' * 0ce e e eP b x q C q  − − + − = , 
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where P  is characterized by equation (11). Totally differentiating with respect to 
  gives 
 
( ) ( )( )( )* '' *2 0e e edqb b C qd  + − − = , 
rewritten as 
 
( )
( )
*
'' *
0
2
e
e e
dq b
d b C q

 = + . (A7) 
Step 2. 
The necessary condition for pairwise efficiency is (12). Since ( )* 0edq
d

  , as 
demonstrated in step one, (12) is satisfied if and only if 
 ( ) 0cg gb x q− + + = , 
equivalently written as 
 0cg g gQ x q= + + = . 
Microfoundation for 𝒌𝒊 
We build on the microfoundation for Assumption 1 presented earlier in this 
Appendix. Suppose that the marginal production cost function is linear so that its 
slope '' 0i   is constant and suppose that the marginal valuation function is also 
linear with constant slope '' 0i  . These slopes can be interpreted as (inverse) 
measures of installed adjustable production and consumption capacities, defined as  
 
'' ''
1 1
 and p ci i
i i
k k   − . (A8) 
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We are now ready to show that ik  as characterized according to (16) can be 
decomposed as p ci i ik k k= + . Starting from (A5) and plugging in (16) and (A8) we 
obtain 
 
( )* '1 i i
p
i i
r q
k k
= . (A9) 
Next, we can plug (16) into (A4) and obtain  ( )( )
*
*
' 1
'
c
i ii
p
i i i
r qk
k r q
−− = , which can be 
rewritten as 
 
( ) ( )* *' 1 'i i i i
p c
i i
r q r q
k k
−= . (A10) 
Combining (A9) and (A10) gives 
 
( ) ( )* *' 1 '1 i i i i
p c
i i i
r q r q
k k k
−= = , (A11) 
rewritten as 
 ( ) ( )* *' 1 '
p c
i i
i
i i i i
k kk
r q r q
= = − . (A12) 
It follows that (i) ( )* 'pi i i ik r q k=  and that (ii) ( )( )*1 'ci i i ik r q k= − . Adding up (i) and 
(ii), we can conclude that p ci i ik k k+ = . 
Proof of Result 4. 
The proof first considers the condition for pairwise efficiency between two flexible 
firms according to (5) in the context of the parametric configuration. We can plug 
in (18) and (7) to rewrite equation (5) as 
39 
 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
*
*
11 3
13 0.
c
e e
e
c
f f
f
b x q b C
k
b x q b C
k
 
 
 − − + − +  
 − + + + =   
 (A13) 
The second derivative with respect to   equals 
 
( ) ( )** 1 11 3 1 3fe
e f
dqdq
b b C b b C
k kd d

 
     − + + − + +               
, 
which is negative because ( )* 1edq
d

   and 
( )*
1f
dq
d

  −  (from (18)). 
Consequently, the second-order condition holds, and (A13) is necessary as well as 
sufficient for pairwise efficiency. We can rewrite (A13) according to (19). 
Second, the proof considers the condition for pairwise efficiency between a flexible 
and an inflexible firm according to (12) in the context of the parametric 
configuration. The second derivative with respect to   equals 
( ) ( ) ( )* 2 * 2e ecg gdq d qb b x qd d  − − + + , which is negative because ( )
*
0e
dq
d

   and 
( )2 *
2 0
e
d q
d

 =  (from (A7)). Consequently, the volumes reported according to Result 
3 represent a necessary and sufficient condition. 
Proof of Result 5. 
There are three scenarios to consider. 
Scenario 1: , ,i j k L . 
When firms i  and j  trade pairwise-efficiently and when j  and k  trade pairwise-
efficiently, it follows from using (19) that 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
* *
1 13 3
1 13 3 .
i i j j
i j
j j k k
j k
x q b x q b
k k
x q b x q b
k k
   + + = + +              + + = + +        
 
Consequently, the bilateral link between i  and k  is also pairwise efficient, or 
 ( ) ( )* *1 13 3i i k k
i k
x q b x q b
k k
   + + = + +      
. 
Scenario 2: ,  and i j L k M  . 
Using (20), we know that whenever j  and k  trade pairwise-efficiently, it follows 
that 0kQ = , so that the bilateral link between i  and k  is also pairwise efficient. 
Scenario 3:  and ,j L i k M  . 
Subsection 3.3 has shown that there are no gains from trade between two inflexible 
firms. Consequently, the bilateral link between i  and k  is always pairwise 
efficient. 
Proof of Result 6. 
From Result 5 we know that it is sufficient to require that firms trade pairwise-
efficiently with a central flexible firm. Without loss of generality, denote the central 
flexible firm as firm e . The necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise 
efficiency are obtained from Result 4. By defining 
1
13i
i
b
k

−  +  
, these can be 
written as 
 
1
 for all ,i i e eQ Q i L i e  −=   .  
 0 for all iQ i M=  .  
Firms’ market shares become 
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1
1       for all ,
0                                     for all .
i e e
j e e j
i j L j M
Q
i L i eQ Qs
i M
 
 
−
−
 
   +=  
 
  
Since 0j
j M
Q

= , we can divide the numerator and the denominator by 1e eQ  −  and 
obtain ii
j
j L
s



=   for all i L  with i e . This establishes Result 6 for all i e . 
Finally, the market share of firm e  is obtained by using that 1
e i
i N
i e
s s


= − . 
Proof of Result 7. 
The proof consists of three steps. Step 1 shows that 2 0i
i N
d s db

 . With this 
result, the bounds for the HHI which are reported in Result 7 can be established by 
investigating the limit as b  approaches infinity (Step 2) and the limit as b  
approaches zero (Step 3). 
Step 1. 
From (21), we know that 2 2i i
i N i L
d s db d s db
 
=  . By using the chain rule, we 
obtain  
 ( )2 2i i i
i N i L
d s db s ds db
 
=   , (A14) 
where 
 ( ) ( )
2
1ii i j j
j L j Lj
j L
d dbds db d db   
−
 

 = + −       (A15) 
and 
 
23i id db = − . (A16) 
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We can plug in (A15) and (A16) into (A14) and obtain 
 ( ) ( )
22
2 232 1 3ii i i j j
i N i L j L j Lj
j L
d s db s    
−
   

   −  =  + − −        
    . (A17) 
To simplify notation, define the constant j
j L
D 

 , where we know that 0D  . 
Using (21), we thus have that i is D =  and that 2 2 2i is D = . With this notation we 
can rewrite (A17) as 
 ( ) ( )2 22 2 2 232 1 3ii i i j
i N i L j L
s Dd s db s s D D s D
D
−
  
  −=  + − −         . 
In the above expression, the positive constant 6D  can be isolated. To show that 
2 0i
i N
d s db

 , it therefore suffices to show that 
 
( )2 2
3 4 2 2
0
0.
i i i j
i L j L
i i j i
i L j L
j i
s s s s
s s s s
 
 

   − − −      
     − + +       
 
 
  
Since the sum of the flexible firms’ market shares equals one ( 1i j
j L
j i
s s


+ = ) we can 
equivalently write 
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( )
3 4 2 2
3 2 2
2
0
0
0.
i i j i j i
i L j L j L
j i j i
i j j i
i L j L j L
j i j i
j i i j i
i L j L
j i
s s s s s s
s s s s
s s s s s
  
 
  
 
 

        − + + +             
     − +       
 
   − +     
  
  
 
 
By splitting up the sum into two parts, we obtain 
 ( ) ( )2 2 0j i i j i j i i j i
i L j L i L j L
j i j i
s s s s s s s s s s
   
 
         − + + − +             
    , 
which is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( )2 2 0j i i j i i j j i j
i L j L j L i L
j i i j
s s s s s s s s s s
   
 
         − + + − +             
    .  (A18) 
Let P  denote the set of all pairs of flexible firms ( ),i j  with , , i j L i j  . Both 
terms in (A18) are summations over all pairs in P , so (A18) can be written as 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
, ,
2 2
,
2
,
0
0
1 0,
j i i j i i j j i j
i j P i j P
j i i j i i j j i j
i j P
j i i j
i j P
s s s s s s s s s s
s s s s s s s s s s
s s s s
 


   − + + − +    
  − + + − +  
  − −   
 


. 
which always holds. 
Step 2. 
From (21), we can obtain that a flexible firm i ’s market share ( i L ) equals 
44 
 
 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
1 3 1 1 3 1
1 3 1 1 3 1
i i
i
j j
j L j L
b k bk
s
b k bk
 
+ += =+ +  . (A19) 
The limit of the HHI as b  approaches infinity is calculated, by using (A19), as 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2
2
2 2 1 3 1 1 3 1lim lim lim
1 31 3 1
i
i ib b b
i N i L i L i L i Lj
j Lj L
bk
s s
nbk→ → →    

    +    = = = =      +     
     , 
where n  equals the number of flexible firms. 
Step 3. 
The HHI as b  approaches zero can be calculated by using (21) and plugging in 
0b = . We obtain 
  
2
22 2
0 0 0
lim lim limi i i j ib b b
i N i L i L j L i L
s s k K 
→ → →    
 = = =       , 
where K  is according to (17). 
